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The Sihanouk Trail was a logistical supply system in Cambodia used by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and its National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, or ''Viet Cong'') allies during the Vietnam War (1960–1975). Between 1966 and 1970, this system operated in the same manner and served the same purposes as the much better known Ho Chi Minh Trail (the Truong Son Road to the North Vietnamese) which ran through the southeastern portion of the Kingdom of Laos. The name is of American derivation, since the North Vietnamese considered the system integral to the supply route mentioned above. U.S. attempts to interdict this system began in 1969. ==Sihanoukville connection (1966–1968)== Prince Norodom Sihanouk had ruled Cambodia adeptly since he had wrested independence from the French on 9 November 1953. He had accomplished this task by deft political maneuvering between both the left and the right to achieve what no other ruler or political group in Indochina had managed, a relatively bloodless transition to independence.〔McAlister Brown, Gordon Hardy, and Arnold R. Isaacs, ''Pawns of War'' Boston, Boston Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 21–24.〕 During the next ten years, while the conflicts in neighboring Laos and South Vietnam heated up, Sihanouk managed to sustain his delicate domestic political balance while at the same time maintaining his nation's neutrality (guaranteed by the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the First Indochina War).〔Doyle, Lipsman and Weiss, pp. 79–84.〕 This was no small accomplishment considering that Cambodia was wedged between its perennial enemies: Thailand to the west and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to the east, both of whom were increasingly supported by the United States (U.S)〔The Thais, for example had been allies of the Japanese during the Second World War and had attempted to annex two of Cambodia's northwestern provinces. In 1956 Thai forces had occupied the sacred temple of Preah Vihear in the Dangkrek Mountains. South Vietnam had once been an integral part of the Khmer empire, and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh had promised to establish communist hegemony over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Under the provisions of the SEATO Treaty, the "umbrella of protection" offered by the Americans only covered communist aggression, not that of the Thais, for example.〕 Sihanouk came to believe that communist triumph in Southeast Asia was inevitable and that Cambodia's military was incapable of defeating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), even with U.S. support. If Cambodia (and his rule) was to survive, he would have to make a bargain with the devil. On 10 April 1965 he broke off diplomatic relations with the U.S. and swung politically to the left.〔Karnow, pp. 590–591. This move was not without reason. For some interesting views of the CIA's efforts to create opposition elements see Prados (1996), pp. 298–300.〕 To gain foreign support, both economic and political, Sihanouk turned to the People's Republic of China. One of the terms of the agreement between Sihanouk and Premier Zhou Enlai was that Cambodia would allow the use of its eastern border by the North Vietnamese in their effort to reunify the two Vietnams.〔Lipsman and Doyle, p. 127.〕 In the earliest days of the Vietnam War, North Vietnam supplied the Viet Cong in the South by two methods. The first was to extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail southward into the tri-border region of Laos/Cambodia/South Vietnam. The Trail, a labyrinth of paths, roads, river transportation systems and way-stations, was constantly being expanded and improved. It served as a logistical jugular vein, for both men and material, for the North Vietnamese war effort against South Vietnam.〔The only work on the system remains John Prados', ''The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War'', New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998.〕 The second method was to transport supplies by sea.〔Estimates of this seaborne traffic ran as high as 70 percent. It was carried out due to the higher volume of material that could be transported by sea, as opposed to the overland route. Prados, p. 296.〕 After direct American intervention in 1965, the increased presence of U.S. naval vessels in coastal waters Operation Market Time nullified the seaborne route. The alternative devised by Hanoi was ingenious. Following on the agreement between Sihanouk and the Chinese, an arrangement was also struck between the prince and the DRV government. In October military supplies were sailed directly from North Vietnam on communist-flagged (especially of the Eastern bloc) ships to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, where that nation's neutrality guaranteed their delivery. The supplies were unloaded and then transferred to trucks which transported them to the frontier zones that served as PAVN/NLF Base Areas.〔Shawcross, p. 64.〕 These Base Areas also served as sanctuaries for PAVN/NLF troops, who simply crossed the border from South Vietnam and then rested, reinforced, and refitted for their next campaign in safety. None of this could have been accomplished without the acquiescence of Sihanouk. During 1965 North Vietnamese forces had already begun construction of new supply routes to connect the segments of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran through southern Laos and into Cambodia. The following year, U.S. intelligence discovered that a new road (Route 110), coming up from Cambodia, was now linked to those in Laos. The discovery of Route 110 was the origin of the term "Sihanouk Trail", but it quickly came to encompass the entire Cambodian logistical system. The new PAVN overland logistical effort, and its seaborne corollary was now directed by PAVN ''Unit K-20'', located in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. ''K-20'' worked under the guise of a commercial company owned by local ethnic Vietnamese.〔''Victory in Vietnam'', p. 465, fn 24.〕 Although the U.S. command in Saigon and the politicians in Washington became increasingly aware of this arrangement during 1966–1967, they declined to overtly interfere due to the political ramifications of conducting military operations against a neutral country and the wishes of Sihanouk. Washington still had hopes of reopening a dialog with Sihanouk, and refrained from any actions that might alienate him further.〔Brown, Hardy, and Isaacs, pp. 83–88. See also Nolan, p. 70.〕 Covert operations, however, were another matter. One result of the increasing PAVN road building effort in Cambodia was that the U.S. also upped the ante against the trail system in Laos by launching the first B-52 Stratofortress strike against the logistical system on 12 December 1965.〔Van Staaveren, p. 133.〕 In April 1967 the U.S. headquarters in Saigon finally received authorization to launch ''Daniel Boone'', an intelligence gathering operation that conducted by the highly secret Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group or SOG.〔''Command History 1967'', Appendix E, p. 14.〕 The reconnaissance teams that "hopped the fence" into Cambodia were under strict orders not to engage in combat and to covertly collect intelligence on the Base Areas and North Vietnamese activities. The result of this effort was Project ''Vesuvius'', in which the American command collated the gathered intelligence on PAVN/NLF violations of Cambodian neutrality and presented it to Sihanouk in hopes of altering his position.〔''Command History 1968'', Annex F, pp. 100–101.〕 It was all to no avail. By 1968 the Americans were well aware of the scope and scale of the Cambodian logistical effort, but still remained reluctant to overtly violate Cambodia's neutrality since the U.S. still hoped to persuade Sihanouk to come on board against the communists. It was also conscious that any overt action might escalate the conflict into the international arena, possibly directly involving the Soviets and/or Chinese. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Sihanouk Trail」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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